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I. Introduction
There are two fundamentally distinct, yet complementary approaches to 
explaining social behavior. The first approach is explaining in terms of 
behaviour physiology. An example of this type of explanation would be: 
People tend to be aggressive, if they are frustrated. Another example: The 
level of aggressiveness correlates to some extent with the testosterol level 
in blood, therefore some individuals may be more aggressive than others 
because of the increased testosterol level.
In general, explanations of this type want to identify the psycho- 
physiological mechanism which produces the behaviour in question, and to 
explain, how it works.
The second approach is explaining in terms of behavioral ecology. An example 
of this type of explanation would be: People tend to exhibit a certain level 
of aggressiveness while competing for some valued ressource. This level must 
not be to high, otherwise there is too high a risk to get injured, but if it 
is too low, one will lose the fight and be deprived of the ressource.
Explanations of this second type want to identify the cost-benefit rationale 
behind observable behaviour: why and in which respect does a certain 
behaviour add to the fitness of the agents involved?
The overall framework of behavioral ecology is the evolutionary perspective. 
The Costs and Benefits of a behavior are measured in terms of the increment 
it yields to the evolutionary succes of the agents. This increment depends 
on the physical and social environment in which the behavior takes place. 
There is an important difference in how evolutionary selection works:
How well adapted most physiological and many psychological traits are in a 
certain environment does not depend on the frequency of these traits in the 
population as a whole. In contrast to this frequency-independent selection, 
we have a frequency-dependent selection of traits, as soon as we turn to 
strategies of interaction with other members of the population. How well 
adapted certain strategies of mating, contest, communication, and so forth, 
are depends on the relative frequency of alternative strategies in the 
population. Thus, a frequency-dependent selection does not aim for 
evolutionary optimization, but for evolutionary stability. Formally, this
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concept has been defined by Maynard Smith as follows (Maynard Smith and
Price, 1973): We assume a finite or an infinite population of agents that
can choose (by mutation, individual learning, socialization, etc.) among an
infinite or finite set of pure or mixed strategy alternatives. Let V , . stand13
for the evolutionary value of strategy i played against strategy j (the 
relative survival chances of an individual playing strategy i against an 
individual playing strategy j). If the population plays strategy z (which 
can be a mixed as well as a pure strategy), z is said to be an 
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS), if one of the following two conditions 
holds
V = V and V > V (2)zz pz zp pp
for all alternative strategies p different from z, which are rare in the 
population- Thus evolutionary stability of strategy z means that a 
population playing z cannot be invaded by a rare mutant p. The difference to 
the classical notion of evolutionary rationality as the result of an 
optimizing process becomes clear by noticing that neither (la) nor (lb) 
preclude the possibility of
That means evolutionary stability may be suboptimal, measured against what 
could be accomplished with the present means under the condition that 
mutations and disturbations of group composition did not occur.
Stability may be polymorphic. Conventional functionalism has taught us 
always to single out one behavior pattern in a population as normal, 
rational, in accordance with the norms and cultural patterns, and to label 
all alternative behavior as deviant, as pathologies, or as an evidence for 
the malfunctioning of a society's socializing agencies. Now we have to 
accustom ourselves, that a mixture of alternative behavior patterns may be a
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stable thing, and that the alternative patterns may be as well adapted and 
as rational as the others. A simple model for a polymorphic equilibrium of 
alternative behavior patterns is Maynard Smith's Hawk and Dove game (Maynard 
Smith and Price 1973):
Let Hawks be those members of a population which fight in contests until 
victory or severe injury, and let Doves be those members, who engage only in 
ritual contests but retreat when attacked earnestly. Clearly in a population 
of Doves a Hawk is king. Hawk wins all contests, and therefore the Hawkish 
habit - by whatever mechanism - will spread. In a population of Hawks Dove, 
however, with its injury-avoiding strategy will on the average do better 
than the average Hawk, and will therefore be able to invade the Hawk 
population, as Hawk was able to invade a Dove population. The resulting 
polymorphic equilibrium is stable, even under extreme environment 
conditions: even if all resources abound, a small pool of Hawks will remain, 
and even in the most frugal environment you do not have to fight for every 
resource but may get it sometimes by luck, therefore also the Doves will not 
die out.
In a more sophisticated version of this game Maynard Smith and Price had 
three more strategies compete with each other:
Bully: attacks as long as not attacked, but retreats when attacked; 
Retaliator: plays the ritual contest strategy against other players playing 
the ritual contest strategy, but attacks attackers;
Prober-Retaliator: like Retaliator, but attacks with small probability non- 
attackers. If in these cases no counterattack occures, he continues 
attacking, otherwise he returns to the ritual contest strategy.
In this game, several polymorphic equilibria are possible. Prober-Retaliator 
and Retaliator are the predominant strategies, while the other strageies are 
maintained at a low frequency. The proportion between the two main 
strategies depends on the initial frequency of Dove, because probing is 
advantageous only against Dove.
Maynard Smith and Price interprete these results as a convincing 
demonstration of the evolutionary superiority of "limited war” strategies in
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comparison to "all-out-war" strategies like Hawk. We will come back to the 
results of this game later.
In this paper I wish to sketch some ideas about the evolutionary 
fundamentals of social inequality among humans, and consequently of 
hierarchy and democracy in human societies.
I will group these ideas in three sections. First, I want to deal with 
social inequality in the access to scarce ressources. This is the broadest 
and oldest dimension of social inequality. Human populations share this 
dimension with all socially living species. Second, I want to turn to social 
inequality with respect to social power. This concept does not mean 
inequally distributed figthing capacity. Rather it means the inequality in 
the giving and taking of orders.
The chance of finding obedience for given orders is in general not based on 
the threat of physical force alone; equally important are the threat of 
being expelled from the community, or the threat of losing respect and 
status within the community, or the threat of being excluded from spiritual 
goods.
If fully developed in this sense, social power is exclusively human. In both 
dimensions, the dynamics work towards extreme inequality, confining the 
larger part of society to a life on bare subsistence level.
The social potential of the human species, however, entails despotism and 
democracy. Therefore in the third section I will sketch the forces in human 
populations which work against this extreme inequality. The basic mechanism 
behind these forces is the ubiquitous emergence of coalitions of commoners 
against the powerful and the rich. The coalitions become possible through 
the division of labor and the growth of specialized technical skill among 
all parts of society.
II. Unequal distribution of scarce resources:
The exponential growth equation and the logistic growth equation are among 
the cornerstones of classical population biology, on which all predator-prey 
and all interspecies competition models rest. The exponential growth 
equation
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N(t) = rM(t) (4)
is a preferred example of how a certain behavior on the individual level - 
reproducing at constant rate r - results in a certain dynamics on the 
population level - exponential growth (see fig. 1).
The logistic growth model in continuous time, as given by
N(t) = rW(t)((K - N(t))/K) (5)
and in discrete time by
Nt+1 = Nt (1 + r{1 " Nt/K)) <6)
furthermore assumes that in linear dependence of the occupation of a given 
habitat the individual reproduction rate is subject to a reduction down to 
the point of zero growth, once the population N(t) has reached the carrying 
capacity K.
In contrast to the exponential growth equation, which has only one - 
unstable - equilibrium, namely the origin, the system modelled by the 
logistic growth equation has an additional equilibrium in N = K, and this 
equilibrium is asymptotically stable: From any point in its neighborhood the 
system will tend to approach this equilibrium.
The core idea of this logistic growth model is that the state of the 
population is reflected in the reduced growth rates on the individual level, 
whether we take this linear reduction literally for every individual member 
of the population, or if we have here in mind only the average member.
This reasoning is inherent in all applications of the logistic growth 
equation - for example the distinction of r - versus K - selection. If a 
species typically lives in volatile environments, with populations far below 
the carrying capacity, evolution selects for producing as much offspring as 
possible, with little investment per individual offspring, this is r- 
selection.
f 3 . 1
t
T U  L o g i s t i c  ojroutli function
-  7
If a species, however, lives in stable environments, with populations close 
to or at the carrying capacity, evolution is said to select for producing 
only small numbers of offspring, but with large investment per individual 
offspring, this a K-selection.
This conclusion from the observed dynamics of population - bound growth - to 
the behavior on the individual level is by no means convincing. In fact if 
we start with two additional, sensible assumptions on the individual level 
from the very onset on, we shall come to quite different results. These 
additional assumptions are simply:
a) the use of resources by any individual is subject to stochastic 
fluctuations,-
b) the access to resources varies among individuals. We can express 
differential access by different rank.
Then we can derive the following simple growth model. The amount of 
resources used by an individual is a function of the population size in 
absolute numbers N, the amount of resources V and the individuals's rank x 
(high rank corresponding to low values of x). Every individual can use 
resources up to a maximum amount a.
The function y(N,V,X) can be specified as having the following four 
properties.
2.) If the distribution of resources is either completely inegalitarian in 
the sense that some members of the population take all resources then y 
is independent of N. If the distribution is not completely 
inegalitarian, then y is a decreasing function of N, once N V/a.
3.) y is by definition of x a non-increasing function of x. If the 
distribution of resources is completely egalitarian, then ^  y / 3 x  = 0.
1.) y is an increasing function of V, with
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4*) In a very general way we can assume stochastic effects on individual
resource intake to be binominally distributed. We regard a time unit
short enough that within this time unit, with constant probability p, at
most one resource unit can be taken by an individual. The number of all
resource units consumed by an individual during his lifetime is then
binomially distributed with the mean y = np if his life has lasted n
2time units, and the variance s = np(l-p). The coefficient of variation 
therefore is s/y = 'if {l-p)/(np)*
This coefficient is a decreasing function of p, which explains, why a 
resource shortage comes along with an increase in individual resource 
usage variation. The more scarcely population is supplied with 
resources, the less unequal these resources are distributed. Therefore, 
we can justify as a fourth property of the function y(N,V,x), that 
the absolute amount of its first derivative with respect to x should be 
an increasing function of N and a decreasing function of V.
We cannot further specify y(N,V,x), but, as we shall see, even from these 
four properties we can get quite a bit of mileage. We just compare the two 
extreme cases of completely egalitarian and of completely plutocratic types 
of resources partitioning.
Let L be the number of individuals who get resources at all, and therefore 
(N-L) the number of individuals who get nothing.
In both cases as long as V/a > N we have
y(x,V,N) = a (7)
In the egalitarian case we have : L = N, thus if N > V/a then in the 
egalitarian case we have
y(x,V,N) = V/N (8)
In the plutocratic case we have L = V/a individuals, each of whom take an 
amount a of resources, while the other (N-L) individuals get nothing. 
Therefore here we have:
9y(x,V,N) = a, for x £ L
and (9)
y(x,V,N) = 0 for x > L
We want to study the population dynamics for these two extreme cases. We 
assume an asexually reproducing population with non-overlapping generations. 
Conveniently we chose the unit of time such that it equals the span of a 
generation. We furthermore assume the amount of resources V to be constant - 
a simplification which will have no effect on the qualitative results of our 
analysis, as long as V remains independent of N.
An individual consumes y(x,V,N) amount of resources, and uses m of them for 
its own maintenance throughout his life, while (y-m) resources are used for 
producing offspring with efficiency h. If an individual receives 
y < m resources, it does not survive to reproduce; if it manages to get 
hold of y > m , it will produce h(y-m) offsprings. The efficiency factor h 
has the dimension: number of offspring per number of resource units. We do 
not take explicit precautions against the occurrence of non integer-valued 
offspring, since this would only complicate the formulas unnecessarily.
The general equation of population growth in discrete time model is
Nt+1 max (1 0)
An analytical solution shows for the egalitarian case
N. = h N.(a-m) for N, < V/a t+1 t t~
and ( 11 )
Nt+1= h for Nt> V/a
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Obviously a necessary condition for N = 0 to be an unstable equilibrium of 
this equation, i.e. a necessary condition for population growth of this 
equation is that
h(a-m) > 1 (12)
the growth factor has to be outside the unit circle for small values of Nt- 
If this inequality holds, the system has a non-trivial equilibrium, at
N = hV/(l + hm) (13)
This equilibrium is asymptotically stable for values of in a neighborhood 
of N, if ^t+1 ~ N)/(Nj. - N) < 1 which is the case if
m < 1/h (14)
In fact, then N is globally stable, i.e. there is no other stable 
equilibrium in the system.
Clearly the maximum value of N. is N, = V/m with NL M  < N.t t,max t+1,max t,max
Therefore the system has an upper bound.
The point is that inequality (14) is hardly ever fulfilled in any population 
where members die after some time (i.e. are not virtually immortal). 
Inequality (14) states that population stability in the egalitarian case is 
possible only if the investment in producing one offspring is higher than 
the investment put into oneself throughout life - a condition which 
certainly is not fulfilled even for large vertebrates with few children.
The model can easily be extended in order to cover overlapping generations 
as well, and thus this statement seems to be a fairly fundamental one for 
all growth phenomena in populations. The other extreme case, the one of 
complete plutocracy, is even more easily analyzed. For Nfc< V/a the 
situation is the same as for the egalitarian case, for 
Nt> V/a the population dynamics is simply
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Nfc+1 = hV(l-m/a) (15)
which reflects the fact, that Nfc+1 is independent of N^, instaed depends on 
constant parameters for all t and is therefore a globally stable non­
trivial equilibrium of the system.
Ironically, in the plutocratic equilibrium as defined by eq (15) the 
population is larger than in the egalitarian equilibrium as defined by 
eq (13):
N , < N , . (16)egal pluto
as long as inequality (11) holds, which is fulfilled once any growth from 
small values of onwards is possible at all.
We can conclude from all this that a plutocratic distribution of resources 
may be stable, while a egalitarian distribution of resources in general is 
not. At the same time the plutocratic non-trivial equilibrium is higher than 
the alternative non-trivial egalitarian equilibrium.
I do not want to finish this section of my paper without mentioning the name 
of Adam Ijomnicki, who in a paper of 1980, published in a rather obscure 
Scandinavian journal, has laid down the core ideas of the argument above.
In behavioral ecology group size for large, socially living mammals is a 
function of the resource location type, of predator pressure and of the 
degree of despotism in the group. The first two factors do not pose special 
problems in our context here. Clearly, in the absence of predators or any 
dangerous competitors, small groups feed more efficiently on scarce 
resources than large ones, and this the more the more thinly and the more 
evenly resources are distributed in space.
On the other hand, with high predator pressure large groups will provide 
their members greater survival chances than small ones, since large groups 
can earlier detect and warn of predators, in the presence of many prey 
predators are more easily disturbed, and will in any case not be able to 
capture many prey at the same time. At last in a large troop, there may even 
be a chance of active defense. The observation of hunting chimpanzees, for
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example, has shown that while a single small monkey, say a macaque, once 
captured by a chimpanzee usually is lost, while a troop of macaques quite 
often by attacking and biting the chimpanzee, is able to salvage their 
captured fellow.
The optimal group size then is just where the two fitness functions of group 
size - the decreasing fitness from foraging opportunities and the increasing 
fitness from protection against predators are equal. The fact that all old- 
world primates who live monogameously, i.e. in the smallest group possible, 
live in areas where no large predators notably large cats occur, and where 
man has not begun to hunt these primates before some decades ago, is seen as 
a forceful confirmation of this theory {Alexander, 1974, van Schaik 1983, 
van Schaik and von Hooff 1983). Interesting for the purpose of this paper is 
the degree of despotism within the group or the effect on group size 
exercised by the third factor.
When is despotism within the group about to develop, and what are its 
consequences on group size and composition? In a simple but instructive 
model Alexander (1974) and Vehrencarap (1983) have considered the cost of 
leaving the group as the ultimate determinant for the degree of despotism, 
which can be maintained in the group. Egalitarian societies' net benefits 
are distributed equally, while in despotic societies these net benefits 
disproportionally accrue to a few members. Obviously such exploitation finds 
it limits by the options the exploited members have outside the group.
Within the framework of the Alexander and Vehrencamp model we can 
analytically obtain an interesting result, to which Alexander and Vehrencamp 
pay no attention.
The assumptions of the model are: In each group there is one manipulator or 
one compact subgroup of manipulators, which can freely appropriate resources 
from the rest of the group. The manipulators will do so to the limit set 
either by the minimal supply an individual needs to live on in the group 
(and to produce surplus resources for the sake of the manipulators) or by 
the option to leave this group and to survive outside. For simplicity, we
13
assume that this lower limit of supply is the same for all members of the 
group.
Let N be the number of individuals in the group (manipulators, or despots, 
as we call them from now on, and subordinate subjects).
Let W(N> be the accumulated resources provided by and to the group. In the 
beginning, the marginal output must be increasing in order to make group 
life versus solitary life an attractive option at all. On the other hand, 
marginal output can not increase forever, beyond some group size it must 
decrease. Thus, this function may conveniently be conceived as a convex- 
concave, i.e. S-shaped function {see fig.2 ).
Let W . {N) be the accumulated minimal resources to be supplied to the m m
group, which are necessary for the subsistence of all group members. Since
the individuals make all the resources available in the first place, before
they can be redistributed, W . (N) in fact is a production function or inputmin
function and therefore has to be conceived at least as a non decreasing 
function. A concave-convex (inverted S-shaped) non-decreasing input function 
(see fig.3 ) may be most realistic (marginal input first declines, than 
rises again), but we will consider linear input functions as well. Both, 
output function and input function are given, and cannot be modified by 
members of the group.
Now let us compare the two extreme modes of resource distribution. In the 
egalitarian mode all resources are distributed evenly, and therefore the 
optimal group size is the one which maximizes the uniform surplus output per 
capita, namely the function:
the first order conditions for a maximum are, after a little algebraic 
manipulation:
(W(N)-W . (N)) / N (17)
(18)
f 3 . 2
V J (N )
Convex - concave ou t put -puwcttoio
f \ 3 - 3
N
concave-- convex inpu t  ^unttLon
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This means, the group size N which maximizes the egalitarian surplus output 
per capita, is the one where the egalitarian surplus output per capita 
equals the marginal total surplus output.
The despot or the despotic subgroup faces a different maximization problem. 
They want to maximize the accumulated surplus output which they subsequently 
will appropriate:
V(N} - W .  (N) (19)min
the first order conditions for a maximum are:
W(N) - W .  (N) = 0 (20)min
This means, the group size N which maximizes the despots' surplus output is 
the one where the marginal total surplus output and therefore also the 
marginal surplus output per capita is zero.
Given the general properties of the output and the input-function - 
notwithstanding whether we consider a concave-convex, or a linear input 
function - the group size which maximizes the despots’ surplus output
is necessarily larger than the group size which maximizes the
egalitarian groups' surplus per capita (see fig. 4):
N , c N, (21)egal desp
Consequently the total output in absolute terms of an optimal group under a 
despotic regime is larger than an egalitarian regime.
This is the surprising result we get from the Alexander/Vehrencamp model, 
that under a despotic regime, optimal group size is larger than under an 
egalitarian one. This is a striking parallel to the result from the general 
population dynamics model in the previous section, that evoluionarily stable 
group size is larger under a plutocratic regime than under an egalitarian 
one:
N t < N , , (16)egal pluto
c o m  ve. X  - com cave, o u t p u t  'puwc'tion
CXŸ\di U^eaK Lhput -punctcOM
LocíU e^ali-tarcau a^cL  d e s p o t i c
f t i v w a
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By integrating the Alexander/Vehrencamp model, which is a rational choice 
model of optimal group size, into models population dynamics, we may obtain 
a profound intellectual access to the expansionism inherent in any markedly 
non-egalitarian social groupings from families up to whole nations: The more 
despotic their domestic regime is, the more they tend to expand and the more 
they tend to use up their natural environment.
III. Unequal distribution of social power:
From the extended Hawk-Dove game - see the introductory section - we know 
the evolutionary superiority of "limited war" strategies over "all-out-war" 
strategies. In the preceeding section we saw how unstable any egalitarian 
distribution of scarce ressources is. An unequal distribution of scarce 
ressources, on the other hand, may lead to unequal fighting prowess. But 
even less well endowed, and therefore weaker members of a group of animals 
have, under certain circumstances, a greater-than-zero chance of defeating a 
stronger member.
Therefore, the lower the level of the actually applied physical force is in 
a conflict, the better for the contestants, as long as the outcome in a 
"limited-war" conflict does not deviate totally from the one in an "all-out- 
war" conflict, to which the contestants still could take refuge..
Because of this joint interest of all potential contestants, evolution has 
favored "limited-war" strategies, which are, in the ultimate consequence, 
"symbolical-conflict" strategies. This is why dominance hierarchies are so 
widespread among socially living species.
Only during the first encounters, when a dominance relation between two 
individuals has not been determined yet, there may be an enhanced level of 
overt aggressiveness. As soon as it is established who is stronger, future 
conflicts can be solved by symbolic means: The dominant displays his 
interest and his undiminshed readiness to fight it out, if necessary, and 
the subdominant, remembering the outcome of the first and aware of the 
probable outcome of any future fight, gives in as long as this giving in 
leaves him with the same chance of using the ressource, discounted by the 
expected cost of injury, which a fighting out would have left him with.
F i g .  !?
A
The arrow indicates that a succ ess fu l attack has es t a b l i s h e d  a 
dyadic dominance relat ion  between A and B.
F i g .  6
u
B
"double receive"
A
B C
"attack the 
a t t a c k e r s "
A
"pass on"
The four p o s s i b i l i t i e s  how in a second attack a triadic 
domina nce  relati on can be established.
F i g .  7
AFter "double attack" and "double receive" the triadic dom ina nc e 
sys tem  is already linear.
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The advantageous function an established dominance order system has for all 
its members, does not explain, however, how its evolution has been possible. 
Dominance order systems can fulfil this function only if they are "linear", 
or weakly transitive: if A dominates B, and B C r then also A C. Non-linear 
dominance ordering systems obviously do not have this pacifying effect. 
Linear dominance ordering systems can be observed in many human groups and 
in many other social species (Appleby 1983).Schjelderup-Ebbe (1922), working 
with fowl, found that in groups up to 10 individuals the dominance ordering 
was strictly transitive. It is not satisfactory to explain this fact by the 
difference in physical fighting prowess alone since these differences 
predetermine the outcome of actual fights only with a certain probability, 
not with certainty.
A Gedanken-experiment may demonstrate this: In a group of N individuals 
there are N! different strictly transitive orderings. At the same time there 
are N(N-l)/2 different dyadic relations among the members of this group. 
Since each dyadic relation in a dominance ordering can be in two states (A 
dominates B, B dominates A), there are 2 ^ N different dominance
orderings in the group. If we make the - unrealistic - assumption, that the 
state of all dyadic relations is completely random, then the probability of 
a transitive dominance ordering is given by
N(N-l)/2
2
Some numerical values for (22)
group size proportion of transitive
dominance orderings
n = 3 .75
n = 4 .375
n = 5 .117
n = 6 .022
n = 7 .002
n = 8 .00015
n = 9 .000005
n = 10 .0000001
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If we assume that there is a weakly transitive ordering of individual 
fighting capacity in dependence of the unequal ressource distribution - a 
quite questionable assumption - and that this ordering of fighting capacity 
translates into high probabilities for an analogeous outcome of a fight, we 
still get a increasingly large probability of non-transitive dominance 
orderings with increased group size. Therefore linear dominance orderings 
cannot be explained as simple manifestations different fighting capabilities 
among the members of a group.
The key to the understanding of linear dominance hierarchies has to be 
searched for in the individual conflict strategies applied in the dyadic 
conflicts by which a dominance system is step-by-step established.
A very promising approach to such transitivity producing conflict strategies 
can be found in Ivan Chase's (Chase 1985) investigations. Working fith fowl 
he found that dominance systems in general were formed by successive 
integration of individuals into triadic or tetradic dominance orderings. As 
for the emergence of triadic and tetradic dominance orderings the following 
could be observed: Three fowl, unknown to each other, are brought together. 
Let A have succesfully attacked B. Thus one dyadic dominance ordering has 
been established (fig. 5).
There are now four possibilities, how in the next step a triadic dominance 
ordering could determine the status of C (fig. 6).
The first two types of attacks ("double receive" and "double attack"), if 
successful, guarantee a linear dominance system in the triad, 
notwithstanding the outcome of the last dyadic conflict, which is still open 
(fig- 7):
The other two types ("attack the attacker", ana "pass on") do not share this 
property.
Chase observed that the chances of success are very high for "double attack" 
or "double receive", either because A, the winner of the first fight, self- 
assertive and aroused, in most cases has an easy game with the bystanding C, 
or because the defeated B has not the resilience to withstand C's attack, 
which immeadiately follows the humiliation in the first attack.
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Chase found that in groups of three individuals, unknown to each other, 91 % 
and in groups of four individuals, unknown to each other, 87 % of all second 
attacks after the first dyadic dominance relation has been established, were 
either "double receive*’ or "double attack".
Barchas/Mendoza (1985), working with macaques, could replicate Chase's 
results.
We can interpret these findings as a support of the postulate that we have 
to look for evolutionarily stable strategies on the individual level, which 
actively produce linear dominance hierarchies. In order to be evolutionarily 
stable, these strategies must contribute more to the individual fitness than 
all alternatives. These strategies will follow some general rules, as
- produce linear dominance orderings;
- try to dominate as many conspecifics as possible;
- once established, accept subdominance.
In all species with dominance systems, dominant rank allows for exploitation 
of subdominants.
The human species has added a new dimension to exploitation (at least among 
vertebrates): rather than just robbing someone you have him work for you. 
You do not confine yourself to what the exploited has collected for his own 
consumption, you have him planfully produce things which you desire. The 
dominance system thereby acquires a new quality. It serves not only to 
deprive other individuals access to scarce resources, now it serves to turn 
other individuals into tools for the production of additional resources.
This requires considerably enhanced cognitive and communicative 
capabilities.
A dominance relation is not the only mean of coordinating productive work of 
several individuals. Equally important is cooperation among individuals 
which do not dominate each other. It is an empirical question whether the
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process of production-by-division-of-labor in early human societies was 
organized along dominance relations or by cooperation in this sense. But in 
any case, dominance systems can be used to coordinate the joint production 
work of several individuals and to exploit the subdominant individuals among 
the process.
One more important development is to be mentioned. Once the groups 
(societies) become larger, there will be workers who produce goods and 
services which are useful by themselves, and there will be workers who 
maintain the coordination and the - inegalitarian - distribution of the 
produced goods and services. For the latter type of workers Max Weber has 
coined the expression "Erzwingungsstab" ("enforcement staff") (Weber, 1956, 
17f.).
Here we can recall a result of section II of this paper, namely that on the 
same resource base a larger population can be maintained, if its internal 
structure is despotic, than a population with a egalitarian internal 
structure.
If we assume equal technology, then a despotic society will not only be 
larger, but be able to translate its superior size into superior power, and 
thus outcompete rival societies, which are not completely despotic. The 
crucial condition, of course, is: equal technology. This brings us to the 
last main section of this paper.
IV. Counterforces against unequal distribution of resources and power
We may begin our last section by raising the question why is it then, that 
human societies (and many non-human societies as well) are not organized in 
the most despotic manner? The answer is: the tendency towards despotism is 
mitigated by the evolution of cooperation, mainly based on reciprocity 
selection.
Cooperation within a group, which means collective efforts for the 
achievement of a common good, is the very core of human sociality, and is
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marked by two characteristics. First, if successful, it makes everyone in
the group better off than if left with the alternative individualistic
solution to a particular problem. Secondly, it is exploitable: from a purely
individualistic cost-benefit viewpoint, the best choice is the one which
allows you to enjoy the fruits of the collective effort without having
contributed properly to its cost: while the worst choice is the one which
leaves you alone with the costs for what is collectively enjoyed thereafter,
because then you have spent more than would have been necessary for an
individualistic solution for you alone. If we denote with V. . the value ofij
the behavior i in an encounter with behavior j, and if we denote cooperative 
behavior with c and non-cooperative behavior with n, then we can express 
these two characteristics by the following inequalities:
V > V > V ) V (23)nc cc nn cn
The problem is: how could cooperation have evolved in the first place, if 
evolutionary success depends on the relative individual advantage of a trait 
over competing traits?
From (23) three basic properties of the cooperation problem can be derived:
(i) Vcc is Pareto-optimal, and VRn is not;
(ii) V^n is a strongly stable equilibrium, and Vcc is not;
(iii) non-cooperation is a dominant strategy, and no mixed equilibrium is 
possible.
Pareto-optimality is obviously no point in a constant-sum game; thus, a 
social dilemma or cooperation game in its most simplified form is a 
symmetrical 2x2 non-constant = bimatrix game, where all strongly stable 
equilibria are Pareto-deficient. Strong stability of an equilibrium means 
that any unilateral deviation makes you strictly worse off. Generality 
requires symmetry of payoffs, because from an evolutionary perspective, the 
cooperation problem within a population or a species as a whole must be the 
same for all members competing for survival and growth. Besides, any assumed 
asymmetry of chances for survival and growth can be justified only with
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additional reasoning: why and to what extent should players be subject to 
different payoff conditions?
Focusing on social dilemmas with dominant strategies as models for the 
cooperation problem has been criticized for being too restrictive (e.g. 
Liebrand, 1983). Considering social dilemmas with nondominant strategies, 
however, seems to be rather questionable.
All non-cooperative symmetrical 2x2 non-constant = bimatrix games without a 
dominant strategy have at least one Pareto-optimal equilibrium (for a proof, 
see Mueller, 1987). It is difficult to see how games with at least one 
Pareto-optimal Nash-equilibrium could serve as models for the cooperation 
problem. Therefore the equilibrium strategy must be a dominant strategy. 
These properties - symmetrical 2x2 non-constant = bimatrix game; all 
strongly stable equilibria Pareto-deficient; the equilibrium strategy a 
dominant strategy - uniquely define the classical 2x2 Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
which, therefore, can still be regarded as the best model for the 
cooperation problem (Boyd 1988).
In the elementary cooperation game, as represented by the symmetrical PD 
game, no other evolutionarily strategy exists but the noncooperative 
strategy.
There are two main mechanisms by which in individual selection (we disregard 
in this paper any group-selection approaches) the evolution of cooperation 
is possible: kin-selection and reciprocal-selection.
The kin-selection-model is based on the notion of extended fitness: behavior 
which benefits Alter at Ego's expense may still be advantageous to Ego, if 
the ration between the loss in Ego’s individual fitness and the gain in 
Alter's individual fitness is smaller than the degree of relatedness r 
between Ego and Alter, measured in the relative quantity of games Ego and 
Alter share:
(24)
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where C is the cost to Ego, and G the gain to Alter. Of course this ti A
concept cannot be properly defined without taking into account the genetical 
variance in the population, i.e. the average relatedness among two randomly 
selected individuals.
Kinship selection of cooperativeness without doubt is a strong evolutionary 
force also in human populations. We only have to consider the importance of 
family ties in politics and business in all societies. Nevertheless Kin- 
selection cannot be the only force behind the evolution of human 
cooperativeness.
In all developed cultures political associations are no more identical with 
clans and family associations. This is highlighted in an extreme manner in 
political associations of which the members are committed to celibacy - like 
the monastic orders, which can be found in many cultures.
It is the quintessence of bureaucratic organisations that they demand 
cooperation among its members, independent from all private sympathies and 
interests, and therefore: independent from all family loyalities.
The widespread occurrence of matrilinear family systems, in which the wealth 
of a man is inherited by his sisters' children, and not by his own children, 
is another argument in favor of additional selection forces for the 
evolution of cooperativeness in human societies.
The most important of these additional selection forces is reciprocity 
selection of cooperativeness: reciprocity of cooperation and non-cooperation 
between potential partners over an extended period of time.
Kinship selection requires only minimal cognitive capabilities: it is 
sufficient to make all my close relatives to preferred recipients of acts 
which accrue certain costs for me, but are even more beneficial to them. 
They will behave analogeously toward me.
Reciprocity selection requires disproportionally more developed cognitive 
abilities: I have to be capable of identifying and recognize every single
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potential cooperation partner. I have to be able to keep in mind his part 
actions towards roe, and my own past action towards him. I have to have good 
empathic capabilities: what was the cost and the benefit my action had for 
him? Has he realized the cost and benefits of his past actions for me?
Reciprocity based cooperation (mostly as coalitions-of-two) occurs among 
primates (Packer 1977) and carnivores (Packer and Pusey 1982), but has been 
evolving among humans in an incomparably more sophisticated form. This is 
the basis for all the complex forms of division of labor, of barter, and of 
power, which distinguished the human sociality from the sociality of all 
other species. It should be mentioned, that reciprocity selection and 
kinship-selection of cooperativeness are not antagonostic forces. On the 
contrary, one may expect, that among kinspeople reciprocity based 
cooperativeness had particularly good evolutionary chances (Rothstein and 
Pierotti 1988).
During the last decade there were many theoretical as well as empirical 
studies of reciprocal cooperation (Axelrod 1981, 1984; Axelrod and Hamilton 
1981, Brown et. al. 1982; Friedman 1977; Grofman and Pool 1977; Smale 1980; 
Kreps et al. 1982, Moore 1984). I can only sketch the most general 
conclusions one can draw from these studies.
(1) The game has to be played for more than one round of moves, since in the 
PD game no equilibrium distinct from the Nash equilibrium - constant 
noncooperation - is possible if the total number k of rounds is determined 
before the game and made known to the players (Luce and Raiffa, 1957). 
Therefore, we have to conceive of an iterated game with an indefinite number 
of rounds. The overall evoultionary value of the competing strategies has to 
be computed by a "discounting'' approach (Friedman, 1977; Axelrod and 
Hamilton, 1981). In its standard interpretation, discounting simply means 
that a payoff in the future is valued less than the same payoff now, and 
that we can express this devaluation by a constant discount on the payoff of 
every future move. Thus a sequence of identical moves, resulting in the 
total payoff .(total) to the player playing strategy i against strategy j, 
would yield the total payoff expressed in present value
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V. . (total) = V. . + wV. . + w2V. . + w3V. . + ___  0 < w < 1 (25)13 13 13 13 13
w being the constant discount factor, or according to the formula for the 
geometric series,
oo
V.. (total) = ?  wkV.. = V. ./(1-w) (26)13 ’ 13 13
k = 0
The greater w, the greater is the expected length of the total interaction
sequence that can be calculated according to
E (Length) = 1/(1-w> (27)
if we assumed the first move to occur with certainty. Thus, by selecting 
different values for w, we can model social encounters of different 
duration, which in whole populations of players can be thought of as an 
indicator of social cohesion in the population. We can define that the 
higher the expected number of social encounters with a given interaction 
partner, the greater the social cohesion.
(2) Introducing the idea of iterated games unfolds its full impact only if 
we simultaneously introduce reactive or learning strategies. A reactive 
strategy can be formalized through an updating function that defines A*s 
probability of choosing an alternative in move k as a function of the 
outcome of round k-l,k-2, ...
Since A's previous moves were also a function of previous outcomes, A's k-th 
move can completely be described as a function of B's previous moves and 
both parties' initial moves. The advantage of reacting strategies is that 
they, for example, can play cooperatively with cooperative partners, and 
noncoperatively with noncooperative partners.
(3) But even the best reactive strategy cannot defeat an ALL DETECT strategy 
in pairwise encounters. Therefore Axelrod introduced a third extension of 
the PD game, the idea of a population game, where the probability of random 
pairwise encounters between different individual strategies reflects the
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relative proportions of these strategies in the population. The total
expected value of a strategy in a population is then the weighted average of
the expected values of this strategy when played against the other 
strategies present in this population.
A critique of these ideas can be found in Mueller 1987.
With regard to our subject - social inequality in resources and power - we 
can state the conditions under which cooperative coordination of individual 
activities has an evolutionary advantage over hierarchical coordination. 
Cooperation, to state this explicitly, does not require partners which are 
equally endowed or equally powerful in all aspects.
Cooperation can evolve among unequal partners, where has to be equality 
among them is that each has to be able of enforcing sanctions (punitive 
moves) against all others (not necessarily at the same time). On the other 
hand, the potential for cooperation is the bigger, the greater the 
synergetic effects of division-of-labor are, which means: the greater the 
additional benefits to be reaped by moving from non-cooperation to Pareto- 
optimal cooperation, the greater the potential that cooperation can evolve, 
provided that the necessary cognitive and ecological prerequisites, as 
mentioned above, are existent.
Ultimately the options of cooperation in human societies are provided by 
the level of technology and by t he level of instrumental social reasoning. 
These options are at the same time options against the power of dominance 
hierarchies.
The subdominants, endowed with ever more specialized skills, and therefore 
more and more difficult to replace, and better equipped to do substantial 
harm as well as to give substantial support to the interest of the dominant, 
are able to secure themselves access to desired resources above the 
subsistence level. The crucial mechanism, by which this is accomplished is 
the creation of coalitions against the dominant members on the top echelons 
of the social hierarchies.
This Hegelian dialectics of master and slave - the master rules by force, 
but the slave educates himself in his work, and finally by superior skill
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and knowledge is able to topple the master, underlies the Marxist ideas on 
the dialectics of technical progress, class struggle and social evolution. I 
readily acknowledgemy indebtedness to this intellectual heritage; as the 
more these ideas find new support by modern behavioral ecology.
The more the members of a group or a society are hold together in a cobweb 
of mutual long-term cooperation loyalties, the more easily dominance systems 
can be disposed of, since this cobweb has not less a pacifying potential.
It is, however, in contrast to Marxist theory, not technology in a narrow 
sense alone, but also instrumental social skills, which drive social 
evolution.
On a very elementary level the role of these instrumental social skills for 
building coalitions of the subdominant against dominants has been studied by 
de Waal and Luttrell (1988). Studying mechanisms of reciprocity in rhesus 
monkeys, in stumptail monkeys and in chimpanzees, they discovered that 
reciprocity has two dimensions, which seem to represent subsequent stages of 
evolution.
The older is beneficial reciprocity: if A does something good to B, B will 
do something good to A in the future. If dominant A, however, does something 
harmful to subdominant B, B will not reciprocate in kind. Such partial 
reciprocity goes well with the strict dominance hierarchies in rhesus 
monkeys and stumptail monkeys. Chimpanzees, however displayed both 
dimensions: they reciprocated against harmful as well as against beneficial 
actions. Quite exciting was, how the problem of the dominance relation was 
overcome, if a subdominant had to square a bill with a dominant individual. 
The subdominant waited until the dominant was engaged in a conflict with a 
third party, and then intervened on behalf of this opponent, against the 
dominant. Thus in quite an effective way low ranking individuals could 
influence the distribution of rank and the balance of power among the top 
members of the hierarchy.
From such ethological studies we may obtain important insights into the 
issue of the evolution of social norm systems. A promising new topic in 
evolutionary game theory are models of the evolution of metanorms of 
cooperativeness in population games (Axelrod 1986). Norms of cooperativeness 
(punish anyone, who does not reciprocate your cooperativeness) are quite
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effectively stabilizied in such games by metanorms of cooperativeness 
{punish anyone, whom you see not reciprocating a third individual's 
cooperativeness).
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